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30 September 2003

Hon. JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR.
Speaker
House of Representatives
Quezon City

Dear Hon. Speaker De Venecia,

This is in connection with the investigation conducted by the Committee on Justice relative to Resolution No. 460 entitled: Resolution Directing the Committee on Justice to Conduct an Investigation, in Aid of Legislation, on the Manner of Disbursement and Expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund, based on House Resolution No. 869, introduced by Hon. Representative Felix William Fuentebella.

In its 8 May 2003 letter, copy attached, the House Committee on Justice, through its Secretary, invited the Chief Justice to attend an executive meeting of the Committee on Resolution No. 460 to be held on 13 May 2003 for him to share his views, comments and recommendations on the matter.

In his letter of 9 May 2003, copy attached, the Chief Justice informed the Committee that he would be unable to accept the invitation because by 13 May 2003 he would already be abroad partly for a vacation and principally to attend official functions from 19 May to 3 June 2003, and that the appearance of the Chief Justice in the said meeting may involve serious constitutional issues which the Chief Justice would have to initially refer to the Chief Attorney of the Court and then to the Court En Banc.

To put an end to all unfounded insinuations of misapplication and misuse of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF), the Chief Justice issued a Memo on 23 June 2003, copy attached, to the Supervising Auditor whom the COA assigned to the Judiciary, requesting the latter to (1) finish or complete the usual audit of the Fund as soon as possible and (2) make, for the appreciation of the total picture of the Fund, a consolidated audit report not only from the time the Chief Justice assumed office as such, but, if still possible, from the time of the establishment of the Fund.

Thereafter, the COA auditors concerned, as well as some officials of the Supreme Court, were invited by the Committee to attend its hearings on the aforementioned resolution.

Despite the audit by the COA which is now in custody of thousands of vouchers and other documents related to the JDF, the Honorable Representative Fuentebella still demanded the submission or production before the Committee of vouchers, records of collections, or other similar or related documents re the JDF which have been passed upon by the COA during the audit.

On 5 September 2003, the Chief and an accountant of the Supreme Court’s Fiscal Management and Budget Office reported to the Chief Justice that in separate letters of Honorable Representative Fuentebella they were required to submit the following reports, "certified under oath,” not later than 4 September 2003:

1. JDF collections of the Court of Appeals and of the inferior courts covering the fiscal years 2000 to 2002;

2. JDF remittances from the Court of Appeals and from the inferior courts covering the fiscal years 2000 to 2002;

3. JDF collections and expenditures covering the fiscal years 2000 to 2002;

4. Sources and amount of expenditures covering the fiscal years 2000 to 2002 with respect to the following items, if any:

a. Renovation of Session Hall and Baguio

Facilities (mansions)

b. Chairs

c. Foreign Travels

d. Publication of Books

e. Cars or Utility Vehicles.

These officials were also invited by the Committee to attend its hearing on 9 September 2003.

The Chief Justice was informed that two officials of the Office of the Court Administrator were also required to submit Remittance Reports for the RTCs and MTCs for CY 2000, 2001 and 2002, which should be certified under oath.

No less than the Honorable Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals was required by Honorable Representative Fuentebella to submit reports or “Remittance of the Judiciary Development Fund covering the Fiscal Years 2000 to 2002,” which reports should be “certified under oath.”

The Chief Justice was further informed that even the COA’s State Auditor Cecilia Caga-anan, who is assigned to the Judiciary, was required by Honorable Fuentebella to submit a “Statement of Source and Accounts of Expenditures, including vouchers and supporting documents with respect to the following items:

1. SC-CA Multipurpose Hall (car park in between SC & CA Buildings).

2. SC Motorcycle Acquisition Program

3. Cash Gift of Personnel

a. SC-CA-Sandiganbayan personnel compared to Lower Court personnel by rank or salary grade

4. Purchase of Toyota Camrys and other motor vehicles.”

The Chief Justice was further informed that during the hearing of the Committee, State Auditor Caga-anan was placed under oath as a witness. Her superior, Dominador T. Tersol, Director IV and head of COA’s Cluster II (Legislative/Judicial/Constitutional Commissions, National Government Sector), even complained that the procedure in the Committee was inquisitorial. Questions were asked to pin them down and to admit that the use of the JDF for the construction of the buildings in Baguio City, renovations of the session hail and conference rooms, and purchase of cars is illegal.

From other sources the Chief Justice learned that the main objective of Honorable Fuentebella is to find a basis for another impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice. Thus, from the start of the investigation some newspapers carried news items and some radio newscasters have already intimated that another impeachment case may be filed against the Chief Justice because of the alleged irregularities he committed in relation to the Judiciary Development Fund. In today’s issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Honorable Fuentebella was quoted as having announced in Naga City that another complaint would be filed against the Chief Justice grounded on “technical malversation” for his having allegedly used a part of the JDF for the construction of “mansions and cottages in Baguio City for the magistrates,” which Rep. Fuentebella claimed, are “unauthorized expenditures.” A xerox copy of the clipping of the news article found on page A-3 of said newspaper is hereto attached.

Also, only this afternoon the Chief of the Supreme Court’s Fiscal Management and Budget Office indorsed to the Chief Justice two more letters of Honorable Fuentebella both dated 30 September 2003 addressed to the Chief Justice. The first of which requests “a Remittance Report of the Judiciary Development Fund of the Clerks of Court of the following covering fiscal years 2000, 2001 and 2002:

1. Metropolitan Trial Courts

2. Municipal Trial Courts in Cities

3. Municipal Trial Court

4. Shari’a District Court

5. Shari’a Circuit Court

6. Presidential Electoral Tribunal”

The second requests “information of the total collections and expenditures of the Judiciary Development Fund covering the months of January to June 30, 2003.” Copies of the indorsement of Ms. Ordoñez and of these letters are hereto attached as Annexes “C,” “C-i,” and “C-2,” respectively.

The Chief Justice very respectfully submits that the requirement for the submission of documents or records on the JDF, which had been audited by the COA, and the manner the investigation is being conducted bring the inquiry far beyond the intended purpose of the Resolution and create a dangerous precedent in investigations in aid of legislation because of the obvious disregard of the rules relative to such category of investigation. More than that, they constitute a direct assault on the independence of the Judiciary, infringe on the Supreme Court’s fiscal autonomy, and cause an irreparable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Let me elaborate on these dangers.

First, the resolution contains no specific statement of the basis of the investigation. There is only a statement that the inquiry is prompted by a “persistent clamor” by some members and personnel of the judiciary for such inquiry. Why there is such a “clamor” and who the parties making the clamor are, are not stated. Such vague and general allegation of the basis of the inquiry cannot justify the holding of an investigation. It is violative of the provisions of Secs. 3-4 of the Rules Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation of the House of Representatives.

Second, the power and purpose of the Committee on Justice to conduct the investigation are not specified in any of the authorizing resolutions (Res. No. 460 and Res. No. 869) of the House. This objection is usually raised when a specific question is asked from a witness, but the Chief Justice sees no reason why the question on the jurisdiction of the Committee cannot be raised at the outset. (Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 1 L.Ed.2d 1273 [1957].

Third, the very purpose of the establishment of the JDF, i.e., to give the Judiciary “flexibility allocation and utilization of its resources] to strengthen its independence,” would be defeated if, on a vague and general allegation that there is a “persistent clamor,” an investigation would be conducted. This would be a violation of the principle of separation of powers implicit in the Constitution and is a threat to the independence of the Judiciary and the guaranty of fiscal autonomy.

What had taken place or what is taking place in the Committee on Justice in relation to a matter involving the Supreme Court, in particular, and the Judiciary, in general, had never been done before. No less than the third organ of government is subjected to a spectacle unprecedented in the history of our country. For one, the JDF had already been audited by the Commission on Audit, the constitutional body vested with “the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution—.” (Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the Constitution).

Yet, no less than the Chief Justice, the COA, and some of the Supreme Court personnel were required to submit records of transactions and even vouchers and other documents related to certain transactions. Moreover, some personnel of the Court and even no less than the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals were directed to certify under oath the required reports or documents. The certification under oath of these documents is not even required by the law. The obvious purpose of course is to threaten them with perjury if there is any false entry therein. Worse still, it was not the Committee itself through its Chairman which required the production or submission of the vouchers, papers or documents, but Hon. Fuentebella, the author of Resolution No. 869.

The abovementioned events or occurrences are clearly designed to humiliate or embarrass the Supreme Court and the Chief Justice and put them in discredit and ridicule, thereby putting in clear and present danger the independence of the Judiciary. What a Member of the House of Representatives may do next is to file a Resolution to investigate “in aid of legislation” on how the President of the Philippines manages or disburses the funds allotted to the Executive Branch and to produce before a congressional committee the vouchers, documents, or records related thereto. Another Member of the House, or even a taxpayer in proper cases, may do the same in regard to the expenditures of the House of Representatives and the Office of the Speaker and require the Speaker to produce the vouchers of the expenditures under the CDF or CIA of the Representatives or even of the district offices of the Representatives. Another Member of the House may do the same as regards the Senate. In retaliation, any Senator may call for the investigation “in aid of legislation” on the manner the House of Representatives or its members disbursed or expended the budget for them.

The House of Representatives should not forget to consider Section 3 of Article VIII of the Constitution which provides:

Sec. 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

The concept of fiscal autonomy is explained in Bengzon v. Drilon (G.R. No. 103524, 15 April 1992, 208 SCRA 133), as follows:

As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary,. . . contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize resources with the wisdom and dispatch that needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.

Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.

The Judiciary. . must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of [its] constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision.

In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed. (Italics supplied).

Although the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) is, as authorized by P.D. No. 1949, derived from, “among others, the increase in the legal fees prescribed in the amendments to Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,” it is covered by the constitutional mandate on fiscal autonomy. Hence, it may be spent without outside control. As recognized in the fourth Whereas clause of House Resolution No. 460, the Court has the “full flexibility to allocate and utilize— resources with the wisdom and dispatch that [its] needs require and to strengthen its independence.”

The investigation directed by House Resolution No. 460, allegedly “in aid of legislation,” clearly encroaches and impinges on the constitutional mandate of fiscal autonomy and the basic principle of independence of the Judiciary. How the Chief Justice administers the JDF is internal to the Judiciary. Hence, the clamor of members and personnel of the Judiciary for an inquiry on how the JDF is spent is a matter that the Court itself has the competence and constitutional duty to address. Section 6 of Article VIII of the Constitution vests the court with the power of “administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.” To allow Congress, a separate branch of government, to pay heed to such alleged “persistent clamor” is to allow it to tread into, and run roughshod over, the Court’s constitutional authority. For the House of Representatives to attempt to settle a “domestic” problem of the judiciary in the guise of an investigation “in aid of legislation” is in derogation of the time-honored principle of separation of powers, as it is clearly an encroachment in the defined domain of the Judiciary.

Representative Fuentebella and some opposition members of the Committee have insisted that the JDF cannot be used for the construction or renovation of buildings or purchase of vehicles. They are of the view that the Chief Justice has violated Section 1 of P.D. No. 1949 (the JDF Decree), which provides:

The Fund shall be used to augment the allowances of the members and personnel of the Judiciary and to finance the acquisition, maintenance and repair of office equipment and facilities; Provided, That at least eighty percent (80%) of the Fund shall be used for cost of living allowances, and not more than twenty percent (20%) of the said Fund shall be used for office equipment and facilities of the Courts located where the legal fees are collected .

The Audit Report on the Judiciary Development Fund for the years 2000, 2001 and 2002 submitted by the Commission on Audit (COA) on 4 September 2003 shows that the Court has not violated said provision of law.

First. The Court has always adhered, as it continues to adhere, to the guideline provided by P.D. No. 1949 on fund utilization percentages. It spends each component of the JDF within the percentage allocation provided by law such that the 80% intended for personnel allowances is maintained and not sacrificed in favor of expenditures for office equipment and facilities. But in keeping itself within the limits of the fund utilization percentages and in implementing the law, the Court has to resort to statutory construction to avoid a strict interpretation of the provision that “20% of the said Fund shall be used for office equipment and facilities of the Courts located where the legal fees are collected” that will result in unequal, inequitable and unfair distribution of the JDF.

For instance, for CY 2002, if the 20% JDF collection in Camarines Sur — the Province of Hon. Fuentebella

— were to be spent in that area alone, the courts therein would have to be contented with the amount of P682,010 for office equipment and facilities, while the National Capital Region (NCR) would have a share of P63,353,062 for the same component of the JDF out of its total collections. Courts do not register the same amount of JDF collected simply because, while increases in legal fees are uniformly applied all throughout the country, the amount collected depends upon the number of cases filed in any judicial area and the amounts involved in these cases.

To ensure a fair, equal, equitable distribution of the JDF, the Court has deemed it fit to construe the law in such a way that the distribution of the 20% component of the total national collection of the JDF shall be in accordance with the needs of courts in particular areas for office equipment and facilities, with those in urgent need thereof prioritized in the program of disbursements so that, as much as possible, all courts could avail of up-to-date equipment and at least basic facilities that are needed in the administration of justice but which cannot be purchased and obtained if the meager appropriations therefor were to be solely relied upon.

The allegation that the Court cannot spend the JDF for the construction of two cottages and a duplex building in Baguio City is founded on a misreading of the law and on wrong assumptions.

Section 1 of P.D. No. 1949 provides that the JDF shall “help ensure and guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated in the Constitution and public policy and required by the impartial administration of justice.” It must never be forgotten that the Supreme Court is a constitutional national body with jurisdiction likewise national in scope. Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution expressly provides that the judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law, and Section 6 of said Article vests upon the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. Hence, it transcends the requirement that the JDF should be spent only in areas where it is collected. In short, for the purchase of its equipment and facilities, including the vehicles for the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices, the Court may utilize its share in the 20% allotment in the JDF that may come from all courts in the Philippines.

The Court holds summer sessions in Baguio City for unhampered writing of decisions, with hearings held only for cases of national importance or utmost urgency. The holding of summer sessions is a tradition that dates back to the early part of the 20th century; it does not reflect the whim or caprice of the present Members of the Court.

Two cottages are being constructed to replace the cottage that was totally damaged during the 1990 earthquake and to provide one more cottage to complete the fifteen cottages needed by the Court. These two cottages are designed as befits the nature of the function that the Constitution vests upon the Court. They will be used beyond the terms of the present Members of the Court in the same way that cottages of the early 20th century vintage have been maintained and used by the Court. Their construction now may, in the end, prove to be more economical not only because of the rising costs of construction materials, but also because without these cottages the last two junior Members of the Court would have to be accommodated during the summer sessions in hotels, which would entail more expense to the Court.

Similarly, the new duplex house will be used by Court officials and employees in addition to the present staff house. It shall continue to be used even after the incumbent officials and employees shall have ceased to hold their positions. It can also be used by distinguished guests of the Court.

For the renovation of the Session Hall, other spaces in the Main Building of the Supreme Court, and the interiors of the new Centennial Building, as well as the construction of the SC-CA Multi-Purpose Building, the Court used JDF funds to address the growing needs for space of the Judiciary that the appropriations for capital outlay cannot meet.

The old Session Hall had become so small for hearing of cases of national interest that the public had to be accommodated in the hallways. This matter had been addressed by the construction of a loft within the hall. The Memorabilia Room was renovated to provide for a Division Session Hall, as not one of the three Divisions of the Supreme Court has a session hail. Allegations of ostentatious expenses are unfounded. The design of the renovated areas, most specially the Session Halls, reflects the dignity that the Supreme Court, as the final arbiter of controversies and interpreter of laws under the Constitution, deserves. These projects were part of the Court’s centennial programs of modernization. Our country and our people would be proud of these renovations.

The Centennial Building now houses several offices that were previously occupying cramped spaces in the Old SC Building. The simple but impressive interior design of the Centennial Building, which is aimed to create a working atmosphere that is conducive to productive service and respect for judicial work, shall serve as the prototype of the interiors of offices in the Supreme Court and in courthouses all over the country.

The first two floors of the SC-CA Building shall house offices of the Court of Appeals or may be used by the Court of Appeals for other legitimate purposes. The third and fourth floors shall serve as parking spaces, which are lacking in Ermita, Manila where the Supreme Court complex is located. The fifth floor shall be the multi-purpose hall for the use of the Supreme Court.

These projects have been undertaken with the guideline on utilization percentages under the JDF law as parameter.

It seems, however, that Representative Fuentebella is of the view that buildings and vehicles are not covered by the term “office equipment and facilities” used in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1949. Unfortunately, he is not correct. The term “equipment” has a technical meaning in law. In Lu Do & Lu Ym Corporation v. Central Bank of the Philippines (108 Phil. 566, 572-573 ), the Court said:

Equipment has been defined as “materials or articles used in equipping as for an expedition; the articles comprised in an outfit, as furnishings, or apparatus; equipage; as laboratory equipment. * * * In industry, physical facilities available for production, including buildings, machineries, tools, etc.” “whatever is needed in equipping; the articles comprised in an outfit; equipage”; “synonymous with furnishings.” Taken together with “machinery,” as used in Exemption No. 3, the equipment referred to therein must relate to furnishings or equipage necessary for the operation of the industry. (Emphasis supplied.)

The. Administrative Code of 1987 uses the term “motor transport equipment” in referring to “automobiles, jeeps, jitneys, station wagons, motorcycles, trucks, launches, speedboats, airplanes, helicopters and other types of motor transport equipment.” (Sec. 75, Chapter 7, Subtitle C, Title II, Book VI (National Government Budgeting). On the other hand, the word “facilities” embraces anything that aids or makes easier the performance of the activities involved in the business of a person or corporation (16 WORDS AND PHRASES 14 citing Hartford Electric Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission, C.C.A., 131 F.2d 953, 60,961, 962). It refers to “appliances and services necessary or convenient in keeping house or operating a business or industry” (BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY, 3rd ed., 448).

Clearly then, buildings and vehicles are included in the term “office equipment and facilities” in Section 1 of the RD. No. 1949; and hence, expenditures therefor may be charged against the JDF.

Some quarters have hinted that Section 1 of RD. No. 1949 should be interpreted in such a way that the 80% component of the JDF for cost of living allowances should likewise be distributed in areas where it is collected. To erase misimpressions on the matter, it must be said that such interpretation would only result in the same iniquitous situation of officials and employees in some judicial areas receiving allowances much lower than those received by officials and employees in other areas where the JDF collection is high. Thus, each court employee in Camarines Sur would receive an average allowance of only P386.00 per month while an employee in the NCR courts would be benefited by an average allowance of P7,202.50 per month. Since officials and employees of the Judiciary are all engaged in the administration of justice, the Court has deemed it proper to equally distribute the 80% component of the total national collection of the JDF subject to the guidelines prescribed by the law in order that the low-salaried employees shall always have higher JDF allowances than the high-salaried ones.

By so construing the law, the Court intends to give meaning and flesh to the intent of the law-making authority that the Judiciary, whose independence and impartiality in the administration of justice is guaranteed by the Constitution, shall “generate its own funds and resources to help augment its budgetary requirements and ensure the uplift [sic] of its members and personnel” (Third “whereas clause” of P.D. No. 1949). It should be recalled that statutory construction is the means by which the court clarifies a doubt in the law to arrive at its true intent; for that purpose, courts may prescribe guidelines to reflect the true intent of the law-making authority. The resort to statutory construction is thus for the purpose of avoiding a strict interpretation and application of the said provision of Section 1 of RD. No. 1949 that would inevitably result in inequitable distribution of the JDF in contravention of the true intent of the law and to the prejudice of the administration of justice.

Second. Section 3 of R D. No. 1949 vests upon the Chief Justice the “sole exclusive power and duty to approve and authorize disbursements and expenditures” of the JDF. This provision notwithstanding, it has always been the policy and practice for the Court en banc to approve large expenditures for office equipment and facilities, such as those for the renovation, repair and construction of buildings, and the purchase of vehicles, computers and other equipment and facilities, whether funded by appropriation or the JDF. The practice in no way implies that the Chief Justice is abdicating his statutorily prescribed power. It simply guarantees the propriety of expenditures, as it provides all Members of the Court the opportunity to determine whether such expenditures should be incurred at all and/or whether these are meritorious.

It must be said without fear of contradiction that the Supreme Court takes all precautionary measures in the disbursement of the JDF. Care and caution are duly exercised because, with the minimal appropriation allotted to the Judiciary, RD. No. 1949 provides the much-needed infusion of funds, without which the Judiciary cannot properly perform its constitutionally-mandated duty of administration of justice.

Third, The JDF is, for all legal intents and purposes, a continuing, but limited appropriation for the Judiciary. The Constitution expressly provides that “the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations (Sec. 25, par. 5, Article VI). All General Appropriations Acts for the various calendar years after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution have provided for this authority.

The use of the unexpended portion of the 20% of the JDF for equipment and facilities for the assailed construction or projects can, undoubtedly, be justified by this augmentation authority of the Chief Justice.

To conclude, the inquiry into the Fund, especially with its confirmed purpose of making it a basis for a second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice, as well as the manner the investigation is being conducted, constitutes (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigation in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the Judiciary. This unprecedented inquiry may be the beginning of the destruction of our democratic institutions especially the Judiciary, which is the last bulwark of democracy and the sentinel of the rule of law.

I trust that the House of Representatives under your leadership will never allow itself to be a part of any plot or scheme to destroy our democratic institutions.

For the sake of our country and our people and for our democracy, I appeal to the highest sense of responsibility and duty of the Members of Congress.

I pray that you take up this matter with the Committee on Justice and with the Members of the House of Representatives.

With assurances of my highest esteem, I am,

Very truly yours,

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

(Source: Supreme Court Website at http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/)