G.R. NO. 174153 – RAUL
L. LAMBINO AND ENRICO B. AUMENTADO TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners, versus THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF
THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), petitioners-intervenors,
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO
MANUEL RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, petitioners-intervenors,
SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT
FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner-intervenor,
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND
GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) AND VICTORINO F. BALAIS, petitioners-intervenors,
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN
S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN
V. OPLE AND CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., oppositors-intervenors,
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS,
INC., oppositor-intervenor,
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA,
oppositor-intervenor,
BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA,
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FROUM, MIGRANTE, GABRIELA, GABRIELA
WOMEN’S PARTY, ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS,LEONARDO SAN JOSE, JOJO
PINEDA, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO, AND DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS, oppositors-intervenors,
LORETA ANN P. ROSALES,
MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA THERESA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, oppositors-intervenors,
LUWALHATI ANTONINO, oppositor-intervenor,
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F.ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON,
FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS AND AMADO GAT
INCION, oppositors-intervenors,
SENATE MINORITY LEADER
AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR. AND SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY A.S.
MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCIRO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM, AND
PANFILO M. LACSON, oppositors-intervenors,
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
AND PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, oppositors-intervenors,
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY AND CEBU CHAPTER, oppositors-intervenors,
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ,
BYRON D. BOCAR, MA TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR AND RANDALL C.
TABAYOYONG, oppostors-intervenors,
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., oppositor-intervenor;
G.R. NO. 174299 –
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. AND RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners, versus COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REPRESENTED BY CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN S.
ABALOS, SR. AND COMMISSIONERS RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR.
ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO AND JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE, respondents.
Promulgated:
October
25, 2006
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
SANDOVAL–GUTIERREZ,
J.:
Vox populi vox Dei -- the voice of the people is the voice of God.
Caution should be exercised in choosing one’s battlecry, lest it does more harm than good to one’s cause. In
its original context, the complete version of this Latin phrase means exactly
the opposite of what it is frequently taken to mean. It originated from a holy
man, the monk Alcuin, who advised Charlemagne, “nec
audiendi qui solent dicere vox populi vox Dei quum tumultuositas vulgi semper insaniae
proxima sit,” meaning, “And those people should not be listened to
who keep on saying, ‘The voice of the people is the voice of God,’ since the
riotousness of the crowd is always very close to madness.”[1]
Perhaps, it is by providence that the true
meaning of the Latin phrase is revealed upon petitioners and their allies –
that they may reflect upon the sincerity and authenticity of their
“people’s initiative.”
History
has been a witness to countless iniquities committed in the name of God. Wars were waged, despotism tolerated and
oppressions justified – all these transpired as man boasted of God’s
imprimatur. Today, petitioners and their allies hum the
same rallying call, convincing this Court that the people’s initiative is the “voice
of the people”
and, therefore, the “voice of God.” After a
thorough consideration of the petitions, I have come to realize that man, with
his ingenuity and arrogance, has perfected the craft of imitating the voice of
God. It is against this kind of genius
that the Court must guard itself.
The facts of the case are
undisputed.
In 1996, the Movement for People’s Initiative sought
to exercise the power of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution which reads:
Section 2. Amendments to
this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years
following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every
five years thereafter,
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of
the exercise of this right.
The exercise was thwarted by a petition for
prohibition filed with this Court by Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago, et al., entitled “Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla and Maria Isabel Ongpin, petitioners, v.
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa
and Carmen Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding
members of the People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.”[2] The case was docketed as G.R. No.
127325. On March 19, 1997, this Court rendered its
Decision in favor of petitioners, holding that Republic Act No. 6735 (R.A. No. 6735), An Act Providing for a System of Initiative
and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, is “incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.” A majority of eight (8) Justices fully
concurred with this ruling, while five (5) subscribed to the opposite view. One
(1) opined that there is no need to rule on the adequacy of R.A. No. 6735.
On motion for
reconsideration, two (2) of the eight (8) Justices reconsidered their positions.
One (1) filed an inhibition and the other one (1) joined the minority opinion.
As a consequence, of the thirteen (13) Justices who participated in the
deliberation, six (6) voted in favor of the majority opinion, while the other
six (6) voted in favor of the minority opinion.[3]
A few months thereafter, or on
September 23, 1997, the Court dismissed a similar case, entitled People’s Initiative for Reform,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. Commission on Elections[4] on the ground that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed PIRMA’s
Petition
for Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution “it
appearing that that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decision of
the Court in G.R. no. 127325 (Santiago v. COMELEC) promulgated on March
19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.”
Seven (7) Justices voted that there was no need to re-examine its
ruling, as regards the issue of the sufficiency of R.A. No. 6735. Another Justice concurred, but on the
different premise that the case at bar is not the proper vehicle for such re-examination.
Five (5) Justice opined otherwise.
This time,
another group known as Sigaw ng Bayan, in
coordination with the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP),
have gathered signatures in support of the proposed amendments to the
Constitution, which entail a change in the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary, thus:
A.
Sections 1,
2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to read as follows:
Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be
vested in a unicameral Parliament which shall be composed of as many members as
may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces, representative
districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand inhabitants per district, and
on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and each province must
have at least one member.
(2)
Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
at least twenty-five years old on the day of the election, a resident of his
district for at least one year prior thereto, and shall be elected by the
qualified voters of his district for a term of five years without limitation as
to the number thereof, except those under the party-list system which shall be
provided for by law and whose number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the
total membership coming from the parliamentary districts.
B.
Sections 1,
2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby amended to read,
as follows:
Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head
of State. The executive power shall be
exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be elected by a
majority of all the Members of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible to the Parliament for
the program of government.
C.
For the
purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a
unicameral-Parliamentary form of government, there shall be a new Article
XVIII, entitled “Transitory Provisions,” which shall read, as follows:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President
shall serve until the expiration of their term at
(2)
In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of
the incumbent President, the incumbent Vice President shall succeed as
President. In case of death, permanent
disability, resignation or removal from office of both the
incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume
all the powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as
amended.
Section 2. Upon the
expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the
exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall
be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered
sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatium up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with
the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to
conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; provided, however,
that any and all references therein to “Congress,” “Senate,” “House of
Representatives” and “Houses of Congress” shall be changed to read
“Parliament;” that any and all references therein to “Member(s) of Congress,”
“Senator(s)” or “Member(s) of Parliament” and any and all references to the
“President” and/or “Acting President” shall be changed to read “Prime
Minister.”
Section 3. Upon the
expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the
exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
which are hereby be amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are
hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad
seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof,
in which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral
Parliamentary System of government; provided, however, that any and all
references therein to “Congress,” “Senate,” “House of Representatives” and
“Houses of Congress” shall be changed to read “Parliament;” that any and all
references therein to “Member(s) of Congress,” “Senator(s)” or “Member(s) of
the House of Representatives” shall be changed to read as “Member(s) of
Parliament” and any and all references to the “President” and/or “Acting
President” shall be changed to read “Prime Minister.”
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of
these amendments, an interim Parliament which shall continue until the Members
of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall have
qualified. It shall be composed of the
incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the
incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.
(2)
The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament
until
(3)
Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until
(4)
Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim
Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this
Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization
and a strong bureaucracy.
Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief
Executive, shall nominate, from among the members of the interim Parliament, an
interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of the members
thereof. The interim Prime Minister
shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such powers and responsibilities
as may be delegated to him by the incumbent President.”
(2)
The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of
Parliament which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the
election of all local government officials.
The duty elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and perform
the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the
expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President.
Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, and written on its upper
right hand portion is the abstract of the proposed amendments, quoted as
follows:
Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of
Article VI and VII of the 1987 Constitution, changing the form of government
from the present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of
government, in order to achieve greater efficiency, simplicity and economy in
government; and providing an Article XVIII as Transitory Provisions for the
orderly shift from one system to another?
On
Amend the Constitution.[5] Five (5) days thereafter,
they filed an Amended
Petition alleging that they are
filing the petition in their own behalf and
together with some 6.3 million
registered voters who have affixed their signatures on the signature sheets
attached thereto. They claimed that the signatures of registered voters appearing
on the signature sheets, constituting at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters in the country, wherein
each legislative district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered
voters, were verified by their respective city or municipal election officers.
Several
organizations opposed the petition. [6]
In a
Resolution dated August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to the petition,
citing as basis this Court’s ruling in Santiago,
permanently enjoining it “from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments
to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to
provide for the implementation of the system.”
Hence,
the present petition for certiorari and mandamus praying that
this Court set aside the COMELEC Resolution and direct the latter
to
comply with Section 4, Article XVII of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 4 x x x
Any
amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days
nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections
of the sufficiency of the petition.
I vote to dismiss the
petition of Lambino, et al. in G.R. No. 174153 and
grant the petition of Mar-len Abigail Binay, et al. in G.R. No. 174299. Here, petitioners pray that the COMELEC
Chairman and Commissioners be required to show why they should not be punished
for contempt[7] of court
for disregarding the permanent injunction issued by this Court in Santiago.
I
Respondent COMELEC did not act
with grave abuse of
discretion
Without necessarily brushing
aside the other important issues, I believe the resolution of the present
petition hinges on this singular issue -- did
the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied Lambino,
et al.’s petition for initiative to amend the Constitution on the basis of this
Court’s Decision in Santiago v. COMELEC?
In other words, regardless of how the other remaining issues are resolved,
still, the ultimate yardstick is the attendance of “grave abuse of discretion”
on the part of the COMELEC.
Jurisprudence teaches that an act of a court or tribunal may
only be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was
performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility.[8]
It need not be emphasized
that in our judicial hierarchy, this Court reigns supreme. All courts,
tribunals and administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions are
obliged to conform to its pronouncements. It has
the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable
controversy. In other words, there is only one Supreme Court from whose
decisions all other courts should take their bearings.[10] As a warning to lower court judges who
would not adhere to its rulings, this Court, in People v. Santos,[11] held:
Now, if a judge of a lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases, that the application of a doctrine promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of reasoning, or against his conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter, but rather than disposing of the case in accordance with his personal views he must first think that it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Highest Court of the Land, and that any deviation from a principle laid down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a sequel, unnecessary inconveniences, delays and expenses to the litigants. And if despite of what is here said, a Judge still believes that he cannot follow Our rulings, then he has no other alternative than to place himself in the position that he could properly avoid the duty of having to render judgment on the case concerned (Art. 9, C.C.), and he has only one legal way to do that.
II
The doctrine of stare decisis
bars the re-examination of
With
The maxim stare
decisis et non quieta movere translates “stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled.”[15] As used in our jurisprudence, it means that “once this Court has laid down a principle
of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it would adhere to that
principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially
the same as in the earlier controversy.”[16]
There is considerable
literature about whether this doctrine of stare decisis is a good or bad
one, but the doctrine is usually justified by arguments which focus on the desirability of stability and certainty in the law and also by notions of justice and fairness. Justice
Benjamin Cardozo in his treatise, The Nature of
the Judicial Process stated:
It will not do to decide the same
question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between
another. ‘If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect
the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on
opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was a
defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To
decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast;
it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my rights." Adherence
to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are
to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the courts.[17]
That the doctrine of stare decisis
is related to justice and fairness may be appreciated by
considering the observation of American philosopher William K. Frankena as to what constitutes injustice:
The paradigm case of injustice is
that in which there are two similar individuals in similar circumstances and
one of them is treated better or worse than the other. In this case, the cry of injustice rightly
goes up against the responsible agent or group; and unless that agent or group
can establish that there is some relevant dissimilarity after all between the
individuals concerned and their circumstances, he or they will be guilty as
charged.[18]
Although
the doctrine of stare decisis does
not prevent re-examining and, if need be, overruling prior decisions, “It
is x
x x a fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior
applicable precedent usually must be followed even though the case, if
considered anew, might be decided
differently by the current justices. This policy x x x ‘is based on the assumption that certainty, predictability
and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal system; i.e.,
that parties should be able to regulate their conduct and enter into
relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing rules of law.[19]
Accordingly, a party urging overruling a
precedent faces a rightly onerous task, the difficulty of which is roughly
proportional to a number of factors, including the age of the precedent, the nature
and extent of public and private reliance on it, and its consistency or inconsistency with
other related rules of law. Here, petitioners failed to discharge their
task.
Santiago
v. COMELEC was decided
by this Court on
III
The proposed constitutional changes
constitute revisions and not mere amendments
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution
lays down the means for its amendment and revision. Thus:
Section 1. Any
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1)
The
Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(2)
A
Constitutional Convention.
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least twelve per centum of the total number of registered votes, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
x x
x. (Emphasis
supplied)
At the
outset, it must be underscored that initiative and referendum, as means by which the people can
directly propose changes to the Constitution, were not provided for in the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions. Thus, under
these two (2) Constitutions, there was no demand to draw the distinction
between an amendment and a revision, both being governed by a uniform
process. This is not so under our
present Constitution. The distinction
between an amendment and a revision becomes crucial because only amendments are allowed under the system
of people’s initiative. Revisions
are within the exclusive domain of Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of
all its members, or of a Constitutional Convention.
The
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission is explicit that Section 2,
Article XVII covers only amendments, thus:
The sponsor, Commissioner Suarez, is
recognized.
MR. SUAREZ: Thank
you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of
the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given us last night,
we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies
the proposed provision governing initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the
complete committee report. With the
permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The
people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held,
directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition
of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This
completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the theory
that this matter of initiative which came about because of the extraordinary
developments this year, has to be separated from the
traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The
committee members felt that this system
of initiative should be limited
to amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the
entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the
proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MAAMBONG: Madam President, will the distinguished proponent of the amendment yield to a few
questions?
MR. DAVIDE: With
pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question,
Commissioner Davide’s proposed amendment
on line I refers to “amendments.” Does
it not cover the word “revision” as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made
the distinction between the words “amendments” and “revision?”
MR. DAVIDE: No,
it does not, because “amendments” and “revision” should be covered by Section
1. So insofar as initiative is
concerned, it can only relate to “amendments” not “revision”
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.[20]
Considering
that the initiative on the Constitution only permits amendments, it is
imperative to examine whether petitioners’ proposed changes partake of the
nature of amendments, not revisions.
The petition
for initiative filed with the COMELEC by Lambino, et
al. sought to amend the following provisions of the 1987 Constitution: Sections
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Article VI (The Legislative Department); Sections 1, 2, 3
and 4 of Article VII (The Executive Department). It further includes Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions)
for the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the
bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary form of government.
Succinctly,
the proposals envision a change in the form of government, from
bicameral-presidential to
unicameral-parliamentary; conversion of the present Congress of the
Petitioners
contend that the proposed changes are in the nature of amendments, hence,
within the coverage of a “people’s initiative.”
I
disagree.
The noted constitutionalist, Father
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, characterized an amendment and a revision to the Constitution as
follows:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one
or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original intention
of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed
necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have
become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In
revision however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a
re-examination of the entire document,
or of provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the
document to determine how and to what extent they should be altered.[21]
Obviously, both "revision"
and amendment" connote change; any distinction between the two must be
based upon the degree of change contemplated. In Kelly
v. Laing,[22]
the Supreme Court of Michigan made the following comparison of the two terms:
"Revision" and
"amendment" have the common characteristics of working changes in the
charter, and are sometimes used in exactly the same sense but there is an
essential difference between them.
"Revision" implies a reexamination of the whole law and a redraft without obligation to maintain the form, scheme, or structure of the old. As applied to fundamental law, such as a constitution or charter, it suggests a convention to examine the whole subject and to prepare and submit a new instrument whether the desired changes from the old are few or many. Amendment implies continuance of the general plan and purpose of the law, with corrections to better accomplish its purpose. Basically, revision suggests fundamental change, while amendment is a correction of detail.
Although there are some authorities
which indicate that a change in a city's form of government may be accomplished
by a process of "amendment," the cases which so hold seem to involve
statutes which only distinguish between amendment and totally new charters.[23]
However, as in
In summary, it would seem that any major
change in governmental form and scheme would probably be interpreted as a “revision”
and should be achieved through the more thorough process of deliberation.
Although,
at first glance, petitioners’ proposed changes appear to cover isolated and
specific provisions only, however, upon careful scrutiny, it becomes clear that
the proposed changes will alter the very
structure of our government and create multifarious ramifications. In other words, the proposed changes will
have a “domino effect” or, more appropriately, “ripple effect” on other provisions of the Constitution.
At this
juncture, it must be emphasized that the power reserved to the people to effect
changes in the Constitution includes the power to amend any
section in such a manner that the proposed change, if approved, would “be complete within itself, relate to one
subject and not substantially affect any other section or article of the
Constitution or require further amendments to the Constitution to accomplish
its purpose.”[25] This is clearly not the case here.
Firstly, a shift from a presidential to a
parliamentary form of government affects the well-enshrined doctrine of
separation of powers of government, embodied in our Constitution, by providing
for an Executive, Legislative and Judiciary Branches. In a Parliamentary form of government, the
Executive Branch is to a certain degree, dependent on the direct or indirect
support of the Parliament, as expressed through a “vote of confidence.” To my mind, this doctrine of separation of
powers is so interwoven in the fabric of our Constitution, that any change
affecting such doctrine must necessarily be a revision.
In McFadden vs. Jordan,[26] the California Supreme Court ruled as
follows:
It is thus clear that that a revision of the Constitution may be
accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution
proposed by a convention called for that purpose x x x. Consequently, if the scope of the proposed
initiative measure now before us is so broad that if such measure
became law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be
effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate
until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention. x x x.
Secondly, the
shift from a bicameral to a unicameral form of government is not a mere
amendment, but is in actuality a revision, as set forth in
The proposal here to amend Section I of
Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a Unicameral Legislature
affects not only many other provisions of the Constitution but provides for a
change in the form of the legislative branch of government, which has been
in existence in the United States Congress and in all of the states of the
nation, except one, since the earliest days.
It would be difficult to visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic
in the American form of government.
It would not only radically change the whole pattern of the government
in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but would
even affect the physical facilities necessary to carry on government.
Thirdly, the
proposed changes, on their face, signify revisions rather than amendments,
especially, with the inclusion of the following “omnibus provision”:
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly
transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamnetary
form of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled “Transitory
Provisions” which shall read, as follows:
x x x x x x x x x
Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the
incumbent President and Vice-President, with the exceptions of Section 1,2,3
and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby amended x x x x x x and all
other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and numbered sequentially
as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with
Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform
to a unicameral Parliamentary system of government x x x x x x .
x x x x x x x x x
Section 4.
(1) x x x
(3) Within forty-five days from ratification
of these amendments, the Interim
Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this
Constitution, consistent with the principles of local autonomy,
decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
The above provisions will necessarily
result in a “ripple effect” on the other provisions of the Constitution to make
them conform to the qualities of unicameral-parliamentary form of
government. With one sweeping stroke,
these proposed provisions automatically revise some provisions of
the Constitution. In McFadden, the same practice was considered
by the Court to be in the nature of substantial revision, necessitating a
constitutional convention. I quote the pertinent portion of its ruling,
thus:
There is in the measure itself, no attempt to enumerate the various and
many articles and sections of our present Constitution which would be affected,
replaced or repealed. It purports
only to add one new article but its framers found it necessary to include the
omnibus provision (subdivision (7) of section XII) that “If any section, subsection, sentence, clause or phrase of the
constitution is in conflict with any of the provisions of this article, such
section, subsection, sentence, clause, or phrase is to the extent of such
conflict hereby repealed. x x x Consequently, if the scope of the proposed intitiative measure now before us is so broad that if such
measure become law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution
would be be effected, then the measure may not
properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed
upon by a constitutional convention.[28]
Undoubtedly,
the changes proposed by the petitioners are not mere amendments which will only
affect the Articles or Sections sought to be changed. Rather, they are in the nature of revisions
which will affect considerable portions of the Constitution resulting in the
alteration of our form of government.
The proposed changes cannot be taken in isolation since these are
connected or “interlocked” with the other provisions of our Constitution. Accordingly,
it has been held that: “If the changes attempted are so sweeping
that it is necessary to include the provisions interlocking them, then it is
plain that the plan would constitute a recasting of the whole Constitution and
this, we think, it was intended to be accomplished only by a convention under
Section 2 which has not yet been disturbed.”[29]
I therefore conclude that since the
proposed changes partake of the nature of a revision of the Constitution, then they
cannot be the subject of an initiative.
On this matter, Father Bernas expressed this insight:
But why limit initiative and referendum to
simple amendments? The answer, which one can easily glean from the rather long
deliberation on initiative and referendum in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, is practicality. In other
words, who is to formulate the revision or how is it to be formulated? Revision, as concretely being proposed now,
is nothing less than a rebuilding of the Philippine constitutional
structure. Who were involved in formulating the structure? What debates
ensued? What records are there for future use in interpreting the provisions
which may be found to be unclear?
In a deliberative body like Congress or a
Constitutional Convention, decisions are reached after much purifying
debate. And while the deliberations
proceed, the public has the opportunity to get involved. It is only after the work of an authorized
body has been completed that it is presented to the electorate for final
judgment. Careful debate is important
because the electorate tends to accept what is presented to it even sight
unseen.[30]
IV
R.A. No. 6735 is insufficient to implement
the People’s initiative
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution reads:
Section 2. Amendments to
this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years
following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every
five years thereafter,
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of
the exercise of this right.
On its face, Section 2 is not a
self-executory provision. This means that an enabling law is imperative for its
implementation. Thus, Congress enacted
R.A. No. 6735 in order to breathe life into this constitutional provision. However,
as previously narrated, this Court struck the law in
The passage of time has done nothing to change the applicability of R.A. No. 6735. Congress neither amended it nor passed a new law to supply it