EN BANC

 

 

G.R. No. 174153             ---      RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners, versus THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL., Respondents.

 

G.R. No. 174299              ---     MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, Petitioners, versus COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, JR. and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and John Doe and Peter Doe, Respondents.

 

 

                                                Promulgated:

 

                                                  October 25, 2006

 

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

 

SEPARATE OPINION

 

 

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

 

I agree with the opinion of our esteemed colleague, Justice Reynato Puno, that the Court’s ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC[1] is not a binding precedent.  However, it is my position that even if Santiago were reversed and Republic Act No. 6735 (R.A. 6735) be held as sufficient law for the purpose of people’s initiative to amend the Constitution, the petition for initiative in this case must nonetheless be dismissed. 

 

There is absolutely no showing here that petitioners complied with R.A. 6735, even as they blindly invoke the said law to justify their alleged people’s initiative.  Section 5(b) of R.A. 6735 requires that “[a] petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.”  On the other hand, Section 5(c)[2] of the same law requires that the petition should state, among others, the proposition[3] or the “contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed.”  If we were to apply Section 5(c) to an initiative to amend the Constitution, as petitioners submit, the petition for initiative signed by the required number of voters should incorporate therein a text of the proposed changes to the Constitution.  However, such requirement was not followed in the case at bar.  

 

During the oral arguments, petitioner Lambino admitted that they printed a mere 100,000 copies of the text of the proposed changes to the Constitution.  According to him, these were subsequently distributed to their agents all over the country, for attachment to the sheets of paper on which the signatures were to be affixed.  Upon being asked, however, if he in fact knew whether the text was actually attached to the signature sheets which were distributed for signing, he said that he merely assumed that they were. In other words, he could not tell the Court for certain whether their representatives complied with this requirement.

 

The petition filed with the COMELEC, as well as that which was shown to this Court, indubitably establish that the full text of the proposed changes was not attached to the signature sheets.  All that the signature sheets contained was the general proposition and abstract, which falls short of the full text requirement of R.A. 6735.   

 

The necessity of setting forth the text of the proposed constitutional changes in the petition for initiative to be signed by the people cannot be seriously disputed.  To begin with, Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution unequivocally states that “[a]mendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.”  Evidently, for the people to propose amendments to the Constitution, they must, in the first instance, know exactly what they are proposing.  It is not enough that they merely possess a general idea of the proposed changes, as the Constitution speaks of a “direct” proposal by the people.

 

Although the framers of the Constitution left the matter of implementing the constitutional right of initiative to Congress, it might be noted that they themselves reasonably assumed that the draft of the proposed constitutional amendments would be shown to the people during the process of signature gathering.  Thus –

 

MR. RODRIGO. Section 2 of the complete committee report provides: “upon petition of at least 10 percent of the registered voters.” How will we determine that 10 percent has been achieved? How will the voters manifest their desire, is it by signature?

 

MR. SUAREZ. Yes, by signatures.

 

MR. RODRIGO. Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the people when they are asked to sign?

 

MR. SUAREZ. That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.

 

MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them before they sign. Now, who prepares the draft?

 

MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.[4]

 

It may thus be logically assumed that even without Section 5(c) of R.A. 6735, the full text of the proposed changes must necessarily be stated in or attached to the initiative petition.  The signatories to the petition must be given an opportunity to fully comprehend the meaning and effect of the proposed changes to enable them to make a free, intelligent and well-informed choice on the matter.

 

          Needless to say, the requirement of setting forth the complete text of the proposed changes in the petition for initiative is a safeguard against fraud and deception.  If the whole text of the proposed changes is contained in or attached to the petition, intercalations and riders may be duly avoided.  Only then can we be assured that the proposed changes are truly of the people and that the signatories have been fully apprised of its implications.

 

          If a statutory provision is essential to guard against fraud, corruption or deception in the initiative and referendum process, such provision must be viewed as an indispensable requirement and failure to substantially comply therewith is fatal.[5]  The failure of petitioners in this case to comply with the full text requirement resultantly rendered their petition for initiative fatally defective. 

 

The petition for initiative is likewise irretrievably infirm because it violates the one subject rule under Section 10(a) of R.A. 6735:

 

SEC. 10. Prohibited Measures.— The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition:

 

(a)        No petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x

 

The one subject rule, as relating to an initiative to amend the Constitution, has the same object and purpose as the one subject-one bill rule embodied in Article VI, Section 26(1)[6] of the Constitution.[7]  To elaborate, the one subject-one bill rule was designed to do away with the practice of inserting two or more unrelated provisions in one bill, so that those favoring one provision would be compelled to adopt the others.  By this process of log-rolling, the adoption of both provisions could be accomplished and ensured, when neither, if standing alone, could succeed on its own merits.

 

          As applied to the initiative process, the one subject rule is essentially designed to prevent surprise and fraud on the electorate.  It is meant to safeguard the integrity of the initiative process by ensuring that no unrelated riders are concealed within the terms of the proposed amendment.  This in turn guarantees that the signatories are fully aware of the nature, scope and purpose of the proposed amendment.

 

          Petitioners insist that the proposed changes embodied in their petition for initiative relate only to one subject matter, that is – the shift from presidential to a parliamentary system of government.  According to petitioners, all of the other proposed changes are merely incidental to this main proposal and are reasonably germane and necessary thereto.[8]  An examination of the text of the proposed changes reveals, however, that this is not the case.  

 

The proposed changes to the Constitution cover other subjects that are beyond the main proposal espoused by the petitioners.  Apart from a shift from the presidential to a parliamentary form of government, the proposed changes include the abolition of one House of Congress,[9] and the convening of a constituent assembly to propose additional amendments to the Constitution.[10]  Also included within its terms is an omnibus declaration that those constitutional provisions under Articles VI and VII, which are inconsistent with the unicameral-parliamentary form of government, shall be deemed amended to conform thereto.   

 

It is not difficult to see that while the proposed changes appear to relate only to a shift in the form of government, it actually seeks to affect other subjects that are not reasonably germane to the constitutional alteration that is purportedly sought.  For one, a shift to a parliamentary system of government does not necessarily result in the adoption of a unicameral legislature.  A parliamentary system can exist in many different “hybrid” forms of government, which may or may not embrace unicameralism.[11]  In other words, the shift from presidential to parliamentary structure and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature is neither the cause nor effect of the other.  

 

I also fail to see the relation of convening a constituent assembly with the proposed change in our system of government.  As a subject matter, the convening of a constituent assembly to amend the Constitution presents a range of issues that is far removed from the subject of a shift in government. Besides, the constituent assembly is supposed to convene and propose amendments to the Constitution after the proposed change in the system of government has already taken place.  This only goes to show that the convening of the constituent assembly is not necessary to effectuate a change to a parliamentary system of government.              

 

The omnibus statement that all provisions under Articles VI and VII which are inconsistent with a unicameral-parliamentary system of government shall be deemed amended is equally bothersome.  The statement does not specify what these inconsistencies and amendments may be, such that everyone is left to guess the provisions that could eventually be affected by the proposed changes.  The subject and scope of these automatic amendments cannot even be spelled out with certainty.  There is thus no reasonable measure of its impact on the other constitutional provisions.    

 

The foregoing proposed changes cannot be the subject of a people’s initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.  Taken together, the proposed changes indicate that the intendment is not simply to effect substantial amendments to the Constitution, but a revision thereof.  The distinction between an amendment and revision was explained by Dean Vicente G. Sinco, as follows:

 

“Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different portions of the entire document. It may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important provisions. But whatever results the revision may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the constitution to determine which one should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one.

 

The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only a few specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention rather is to improve specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seem obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect.”[12]

 

          The foregoing traditional exposition of the difference between amendment and revision has indeed guided us throughout our constitutional history.  However, the distinction between the two terms is not, to my mind, as significant in the context of our past constitutions, as it should be now under the 1987 Constitution.  The reason for this is apparent. Under our past constitutions, it was Congress alone, acting either as a constituent assembly or by calling out a constitutional convention, that exercised authority to either amend or revise the Constitution through the procedures therein described.  Although the distinction between the two terms was theoretically recognized under both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the need to highlight the difference was not as material because it was only Congress that could effect constitutional changes by choosing between the two modalities.

 

          However, it is different now under the 1987 Constitution.  Apart from providing for the two modes of either Congress constituting itself as a constituent assembly or calling out for a constitutional convention, a third mode was introduced for proposing changes to the Constitution.  This mode refers to the people’s right to propose amendments to the fundamental law through the filing of a petition for initiative.

 

          Otherwise stated, our experience of what constitutes amendment or revision under the past constitutions is not determinative of what the two terms mean now, as related to the exercise of the right to propose either amendments or revision.  The changes introduced to both the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973 could have indeed been deemed an amendment or revision, but the authority for effecting either would never have been questioned since the same belonged solely to Congress.  In contrast, the 1987 Constitution clearly limits the right of the people to directly propose constitutional changes to amendments only.  We must consequently not be swayed by examples of constitutional changes effected prior to the present fundamental law, in determining whether such changes are revisory or amendatory in nature.

 

          In this regard, it should be noted that the distinction laid down by Justice Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. Executive Secretary[13] related to the procedure to be followed in ratifying a completely new charter proposed by a constitutional convention.  The authority or right of the constitutional convention itself to effect such a revision was not put in issue in that case. As far as determining what constitutes “amendments” for the purpose of a people’s initiative, therefore, we have neither relevant precedent nor prior experience.  We must thus confine ourselves to Dean Sinco’s basic articulation of the two terms.

 

It is clear from Dean Sinco’s explanation that a revision may either be of the whole or only part of the Constitution.  The part need not be a substantial part as a change may qualify as a revision even if it only involves some of the important provisions.  For as long as the intention and plan to be carried out contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the Constitution “to determine which should be altered or suppressed, or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one,” the proposed change may be deemed a revision and not merely an amendment.

 

Thus, it is not by the sheer number alone of the proposed changes that the same may be considered as either an amendment or revision.  In so determining, another overriding factor is the “original intention and plan authorized to be carried out” by the proposed changes.  If the same relates to a re-examination of the entire document to see which provisions remain relevant or if it has far-reaching effects on the entire document, then the same constitutes a revision and not a mere amendment of the Constitution.

 

From the foregoing, it is readily apparent that a combination of the quantitative and qualitative test is necessary in assessing what may be considered as an amendment or revision.  It is not enough that we focus simply on the physical scope of the proposed changes, but also consider what it means in relation to the entire document.  No clear demarcation line can be drawn to distinguish the two terms and each circumstance must be judged on the basis of its own peculiar conditions.  The determination lies in assessing the impact that the proposed changes may have on the entire instrument, and not simply on an arithmetical appraisal of the specific provisions which it seeks to affect.

 

In McFadden v. Jordan,[14] the California Supreme Court laid down the groundwork for the combination of quantitative and qualitative assessment of proposed constitutional changes, in order to determine whether the same is revisory or merely amendatory.  In that case, the McFadden court found the proposed changes extensive since at least 15 of the 25 articles contained in the California Constitution would either be repealed in their entirety or substantially altered, and four new topics would be introduced.  However, it went on to consider the qualitative effects that the proposed initiative measure would have on California’s basic plan of government.  It observed that the proposal would alter the checks and balances inherent in such plan, by delegating far-reaching and mixed powers to an independent commission created under the proposed measure. Consequently, the proposal in McFadden was not only deemed as broad and numerous in physical scope, but was also held as having a substantive effect on the fundamental governmental plan of the State of California.           

 

The dual aspect of the amendment/revision analysis was reiterated by the California Supreme Court in Raven v. Deukmeijan.[15]  Proposition 115, as the initiative in that case was called, would vest in the United States Supreme Court all judicial interpretative powers of the California courts over fundamental criminal defense rights in that state.  It was observed that although quantitatively, the proposition did “not seem so extensive as to change directly the substantial entirety of the Constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions,” the same, nonetheless, “would substantially alter the substance and integrity of the state Constitution as a document of independent force and effect.”  Quoting Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization,[16] the Raven court said:

 

“. . . apart from a measure effecting widespread deletions, additions and amendments involving many constitutional articles, ‘even a relatively simple enactment may accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision also…[A]n enactment which purported to vest all judicial power in the Legislature would amount to a revision without regard either to the length or complexity of the measure or the number of existing articles or sections affected by such change.’” (Underscoring supplied and citations omitted)       

 

Thus, in resolving the amendment/revision issue, the California Court examines both the quantitative and qualitative effects of a proposed measure on its constitutional scheme.  Substantial changes in either respect could amount to a revision.[17]

 

          I am persuaded that we can approach the present issue in the same manner.  The experience of the courts in California is not far removed from the standards expounded on by Dean Sinco when he set out to differentiate between amendment and revision.  It is actually consistent, not only with our traditional concept of the two terms, but also with the mindset of our constitutional framers when they referred to the disquisition of Justice Antonio in Javellana.[18]  We must thus consider whether the proposed changes in this case affect our Constitution in both its substantial physical entirety and in its basic plan of government.

 

          The question posed is: do the proposed changes, regardless of whether these are simple or substantial, amount to a revision as to be excluded from the people’s right to directly propose amendments to the fundamental law?

 

          As indicated earlier, we may apply the quantitative/qualitative test in determining the nature of the proposed changes.  These tests are consistent with Dean Sinco’s traditional concept of amendment and revision when he explains that, quantitatively, revision “may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater part of it, or perhaps only some of its provisions.”  In any case, he continues, “the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out.”  Unmistakably, the latter statement refers to the qualitative effect of the proposed changes.    

 

          It may thus be conceded that, quantitatively, the changes espoused by the proponents in this case will affect only two (2) out of the eighteen (18) articles of the 1987 Constitution, namely, Article VI (Legislative Department) and Article VII (Executive Department), as well as provisions that will ensure the smooth transition from a presidential-bicameral system to a parliamentary-unicameral structure of government.  The quantitative effect of the proposed changes is neither broad nor extensive and will not affect the substantial entirety of the 1987 Constitution.

 

          However, it is my opinion that the proposed changes will have serious qualitative consequences on the Constitution.  The initiative petition, if successful, will undoubtedly alter, not only our basic governmental plan, but also redefine our rights as citizens in relation to government.  The proposed changes will set into motion a ripple effect that will strike at the very foundation of our basic constitutional plan.  It is therefore an impermissible constitutional revision that may not be effected through a people’s initiative.                      

 

          Petitioners’ main proposal pertains to the shifting of our form of government from the presidential to the parliamentary system.  An examination of their proposal reveals that there will be a fusion of the executive and legislative departments into one parliament that will be elected on the basis of proportional representation.  No term limits are set for the members of parliament except for those elected under the party-list system whose terms and number shall be provided by law.  There will be a President who shall be the head of state, but the head of government is the Prime Minister.  The latter and his cabinet shall be elected from among the members of parliament and shall be responsible to parliament for the program of government.

 

          The preceding proposal indicates that, under the proposed system, the executive and legislature shall be one and the same, such that parliament will be the paramount governing institution.  What this implies is that there will be no separation between the law-making and enforcement powers of the state, that are traditionally delineated between the executive and legislature in a presidential form of government.  Necessarily, the checks and balances inherent in the fundamental plan of our U.S.-style presidential system will be eliminated.  The workings of government shall instead be controlled by the internal political dynamics prevailing in the parliament.               

 

          Our present governmental system is built on the separation of powers among the three branches of government.  The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws and the judiciary to the application of laws.  This separation is intended to prevent a concentration of authority in one person or group that might lead to an irreversible error or abuse in its exercise to the detriment of our republican institutions.  In the words of Justice Laurel, the doctrine of separation of powers is intended to secure action, to forestall overaction, to prevent despotism and obtain efficiency.[19] 

 

          In the proposed parliamentary system, there is an obvious lack of formal institutional checks on the legislative and executive powers of the state, since both the Prime Minister and the members of his cabinet are drawn from parliament.  There are no effective limits to what the Prime Minister and parliament can do, except the will of the parliamentary majority.  This goes against the central principle of our present constitutional scheme that distributes the powers of government and provides for counteraction among the three branches.  Although both the presidential and parliamentary systems are theoretically consistent with constitutional democracy, the underlying tenets and resulting governmental framework are nonetheless radically different.

 

Consequently, the shift from presidential to parliamentary form of government cannot be regarded as anything but a drastic change.  It will require a total overhaul of our governmental structure and involve a re-orientation in the cardinal doctrines that govern our constitutional set-up.  As explained by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure.[20]  It cannot, by any standard, be deemed as a mere constitutional amendment.

 

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent they should be altered.[21] (Underscoring supplied)      

 

The inclusion of a proposal to convene a constituent assembly likewise shows the intention of the proponents to effect even more far-reaching changes in our fundamental law.  If the original intent were to simply shift the form of government to the parliamentary system, then there would have been no need for the calling out of a constituent assembly to propose further amendments to the Constitution.  It should be noted that, once convened, a constituent assembly can do away and replace any constitutional provision which may not even have a bearing on the shift to a parliamentary system of government.  The inclusion of such a proposal reveals the proponents’ plan to consider all provisions of the constitution, either to determine which of its provisions should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one.

 

          Consequently, it is not true that only Articles VI and VII are covered by the alleged people’s initiative.  The proposal to convene a constituent assembly, which by its terms is mandatory, will practically jeopardize the future of the entire Constitution and place it on shaky grounds.  The plan of the proponents, as reflected in their proposed changes, goes beyond the shifting of government from the presidential to the parliamentary system. Indeed, it could even extend to the “fundamental nature of our state as a democratic and republican state.”

 

          To say that the proposed changes will affect only the constitution of government is therefore a fallacy.  To repeat, the combined effect of the proposed changes to Articles VI and VII and those pertaining to the Transitory Provisions under Article XVIII indubitably establish the intent and plan of the proponents to possibly affect even the constitutions of liberty and sovereignty.  Indeed, no valid reason exists for authorizing further amendments or revisions to the Constitution if the intention of the proposed changes is truly what it purports to be.

 

There is no question here that only amendments to the Constitution may be undertaken through a people’s initiative and not a revision, as textually reflected in the Constitution itself.  This conclusion is inevitable especially from a comparative examination of Section 2 in relation to Sections 1 and 4 of Article XVII, which state:

 

SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

 

(1)        The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or

(2)        A constitutional convention.

 

SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

           

            The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

 

x x x x

 

SECTION 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.

 

            Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission of Elections of the sufficiency of the petition. (Underscoring supplied)    

 

          It is clear that the right of the people to directly propose changes to the Constitution is limited to amendments and does not include a revision thereof.  Otherwise, it would have been unnecessary to provide for Section 2 to distinguish its scope from the rights vested in Congress under Section 1. The latter lucidly states that Congress may propose both amendments and a revision of the Constitution by either convening a constituent assembly or calling for a constitutional convention.  Section 2, on the other hand, textually commits to the people the right to propose only amendments by direct action.

 

          To hold, therefore, that Section 2 allows substantial amendments amounting to revision obliterates the clear distinction in scope between Sections 1 and 2.  The intention, as may be seen from a cursory perusal of the above provisions, is to provide differing fields of application for the three modes of effecting changes to the Constitution.  We need not even delve into the intent of the constitutional framers to see that the distinction in scope is definitely marked.  We should thus apply these provisions with a discerning regard for this distinction.  Again, McFadden[22] is instructive:           

 

 “. . . The differentiation required is not merely between two words; more accurately it is between two procedures and between their respective fields of application. Each procedure, if we follow elementary principles of statutory construction, must be understood to have a substantial field of application, not to be x x x a mere alternative procedure in the same field. Each of the two words, then, must be understood to denote, respectively, not only a procedure but also a field of application appropriate to its procedure. The people of this state have spoken; they made it clear when they adopted article XVIII and made amendment relatively simple but provided the formidable bulwark of a constitutional convention as a protection against improvident or hasty (or any other) revision, that they understood that there was a real difference between amendment and revision. We find nothing whatsoever in the language of the initiative amendment of 1911 (art. IV, § 1) to effect a breaking down of that difference. On the contrary, the distinction appears to be x x x scrupulously preserved by the express declaration in the amendment x x x that the power to propose and vote on "amendments to the Constitution" is reserved directly to the people in initiative proceedings, while leaving unmentioned the power and the procedure relative to constitutional revision, which revisional power and procedure, it will be remembered, had already been specifically treated in section 2 of article XVIII. Intervenors' contention--that any change less than a total one is but amendatory--would reduce to the rubble of absurdity the bulwark so carefully erected and preserved. Each situation involving the question of amendment, as contrasted with revision, of the Constitution must, we think, be resolved upon its own facts.”

 

Thus, our people too have spoken when they overwhelmingly ratified the 1987 Constitution, with the provisions on amendments and revisions under Article XVII.  The voice and will of our people cannot be any clearer when they limited people’s initiative to mere amendments of the fundamental law and excluded revisions in its scope.  In this regard, the task of the Court is to give effect to the people’s voice, as expressed unequivocally through the Constitution.

 

Article XVII on amendments and revisions is called a “constitution of sovereignty” because it defines the constitutional meaning of “sovereignty of the people.”  It is through these provisions that the sovereign people have allowed the expression of their sovereign will and have canalized their powers which would otherwise be plenary.  By approving these provisions, the sovereign people have decided to limit themselves and future generations in the exercise of their sovereign power.[23]  They are thus bound by the constitution and are powerless, whatever their numbers, to change or thwart its mandates, except through the means prescribed by the Constitution itself.[24]

 

It is thus misplaced to argue that the people may propose revisions to the Constitution through people’s initiative because their representatives, whose power is merely delegated, may do so.  While Section 1 of Article XVII may be considered as a provision delegating the sovereign powers of amendment and revision to Congress, Section 2, in contrast, is a self-limitation on that sovereign power.  In the words of Cooley:

 

x x x Although by their constitutions the people have delegated the exercise of sovereign powers to the several departments, they have not thereby divested themselves of the sovereignty.  They retain in their own hands, so far as they have thought it needful to do so, a power to control the governments they create, and the three departments are responsible to and subject to be ordered, directed, changed or abolished by them.  But this control and direction must be exercised in the legitimate mode previously agreed upon.  The voice of the people, acting in their sovereign capacity, can be of legal force only when expressed at the times and under the conditions which they themselves have prescribed and pointed out by the Constitution, or which, consistently with the Constitution, have been prescribed and pointed out for them by statute; and if by any portion of the people, however large, an attempt should be made to interfere with the regular working of the agencies of government at any other time or in any other mode than as allowed by existing law, either constitutional or statutory, it would be revolutionary in character, and must be resisted and repressed by the officers who, for the time being, represent legitimate government.[25] (Underscoring supplied)

 

Consequently, there is here no case of “the spring rising above its source.”  Nor is it one where the people’s sovereign power has been relegated to a lesser plane than that of Congress.  In choosing to exercise self-limitation, there is no absence or lack of even a fraction of the sovereign power of the people since self-limitation itself is an expression of that sovereign power.  The people have chosen to delegate and limit their sovereign power by virtue of the Constitution and are bound by the parameters that they themselves have ordained.  Otherwise, if the people choose to defy their self-imposed constitutional restraints, we will be faced with a revolutionary situation.[26] 

 

It has repeatedly been emphasized that ours is a democratic and republican state.[27]  Even as we affirm, however, that aspect of direct democracy, we should not forget that, first and foremost, we are a constitutional democracy.  To uphold direct democracy at the expense of the fundamental law is to sanction, not a constitutional, but an extra-constitutional recourse.  This is clearly beyond the powers of the Court who, by sovereign mandate, is the guardian and keeper of the Constitution.

 

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.

 

                                     

                                               CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

                                                              Associate Justice