RESPONDENT Noel Sacramento Saluta filed a complaint against CRV Corp. and petitioner Celia Atienza for illegal dismissal and money claims. He alleged that he was hired as a company driver by CRV Corp. He was assigned to drive for the petitioner Celia Atienza, one of the company’s top officials and received P9,000 monthly salary.
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that respondent was not an employee of CRV Corp. but was hired as her personal/family driver. His duty was simply to drive for her and her family to anywhere they wish to go. Aside from his monthly salary, he enjoyed free board and lodging.
The Supreme Court ruled that respondent is a family driver of the petitioner.
The question that cropped up is as to which law governs his rights as such: the Labor Code or the Civil Code?
Ruling: The Civil Code.
Article 141, Chapter 3, Book III on Employment of Househelpers of the Labor Code provides that family drivers are covered in the term domestic or household service.
Thus, under the Labor Code, the rules for indemnity in case a family driver is terminated from the service shall be governed by Article 149 thereof.
However, Section 44 of Republic Act 10361, otherwise known as the “Domestic Workers Act” or “Batas Kasambahay” (Kasambahay Law), expressly repealed Chapter III (Employment of Househelpers) of the Labor Code, which includes Articles 141 and 149 mentioned above.
The Kasambahay Law, on the other hand, made no mention of family drivers in the enumeration of those workers who are covered by the law. This is unlike Article 141 of the Labor Code.
Thus, Section 4(d) of the Kasambahay Law pertaining to who are included in the enumeration of domestic or household help cannot also be interpreted to include family drivers because the latter category of worker is clearly not included. It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others—this is expressed in the familiar maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Moreover, Section 2 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the Kasambahay Law provides:
Section 2. Coverage—This IRR shall apply to all parties to an employment contract for the services of the following Kasambahay, whether on a live-in or live-out arrangement, such as but not limited to:
The following are not covered:
(a) Service providers;
(b) Family drivers;
The aforecited administrative rule clarified the status of family drivers as among those not covered by the definition of domestic or household help as contemplated in Section 4(d) of the Kasambahay Law. Such provision should be respected by the courts, as the interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement the statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. Moreover, the statutory validity of the same administrative rule was never challenged. This Court has ruled time and again that the constitutionality or validity of laws, orders, or such other rules with the force of law cannot be attacked collaterally. There is a legal presumption of validity of these laws and rules. Unless a law or rule is annulled in a direct proceeding, the legal presumption of its validity stands. And while it is true that constitutional provisions on social justice demand that doubts be resolved in favor of labor, it is only applicable when there is doubt. Social justice principles cannot be used to expand the coverage of the law to subjects not intended by the Congress to be included.
Due to the express repeal of the Labor Code provisions pertaining to househelpers, which includes family drivers, by the Kasambahay Law; and the non-applicability of the Kasambahay Law to family drivers, there is a need to revert back to the Civil Code provisions, particularly Articles 1689, 1697 and 1699, Section 1, Chapter 3, Title VIII, Book IV thereof. (Celia R. Atienza vs. Noel Sacramento Saluta, G.R. 233413, June 17, 2019).