THE end of the five-month military operations in Marawi signals that rehabilitation and recovery work can now proceed in full swing. That the principle “building back better” is being raised is important. But it is not enough. It is not simply a matter of pursuing physical reconstruction to a level where Marawi could withstand exposure to similar levels of destructive forces in the future. It also means being conflict sensitive, building peace, and supporting good governance not only in Marawi, but also in the rest of Lanao del Sur and other areas to prevent a recurrence of the crisis.
Task Force Bangon Marawi (TFBM) is already undertaking a Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) to generate information for preparing the Bangon Marawi Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Program for Marawi and other affected localities. Incidentally, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Bank (WB), and European Union have developed the Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (RPBA) as a successor to the PCNA, noting the need to further heighten conflict sensitivity to be fully responsive to post-conflict situations.
The peace and conflict lens is highly relevant because—at the risk of pointing out the obvious, what ripped through Marawi was a disaster unlike anything that the Philippines has ever known in contemporary times.
Unlike other intense but short battles fought in rural or mountainous areas against forces pursuing their avowed political agenda, the Philippine security sector had to scramble to engage in urban warfare against a group mainly out to impose terror on civilians.
Even the 20-day siege of Zamboanga City by the MNLF cannot serve as comparison. More than differences in the means of warfare used and the degree of destruction wrought in the two cities, the conflict in Marawi, which has for triggers previous confrontations with the Dawla Islamiyya in Butig and Piagapo in 2016 and early 2017, is different. Understanding its nature and causes through conflict analysis will be key to conflict sensitivity and peace building.
Insisting on a one-dimensional and nicely wrapped explanation for the Marawi crisis maybe convenient and tempting, but it is also a guarantee that all conflict prevention efforts proceeding from that will turn out to be inadequate. That the Butig-Piagapo-Marawi conflicts were about violent extremists seeking recognition and support from the Islamic State is one explanation. But it needs to be understood within contexts and factors that include alleged involvement by political and economic interest groups in illegal drugs and other criminal activities, weak governance and unchecked corruption, proliferation of loose firearms and private armed groups, frustration with the justice system that further entrench rido, growing dissatisfaction with the peace process, and unaddressed high levels of poverty and marginalization, among others.
The stand of the Bangon Marawi CSO Platform that post-conflict responses should regard “Marawi as the focus and Ranaw as the locus” recognizes that conflict causes know no politico-geographic-administrative borders as well as the interactive nature of conflict actors and factors.
Conflict sensitivity and peace building advocates recommend operationalizing the tandem through doing no harm and doing maximum good, building on the positive, mitigating unintended consequences, and strengthening capacity to sustain peace. There will be many motivations and opportunities for pursuing these practices in Marawi and Lanao del Sur.
On paper TFBM was originally composed only of national government offices. While that can be read as demonstrative of a high-level response to the crisis, in this instance there is no real advantage to marginalizing local governments. The TFBM later included representatives from the ARMM Regional Government and the Marawi and Lanao del Sur LGUs.
Both the Provincial and City Governments prepared plans which they intend to contribute to the planning work of the TFBM. The plan produced out of the efforts anchored by the Lanao del Sur Provincial LGU in particular was guided by the RPBA framework. These local efforts deserve to be taken note of and maximized despite the current tensions between national government and the Lanao del Sur LGUs.
President Rodrigo Duterte was quoted as saying, “I think I’ll have to purge them”, in reference to Lanao Sur officials viewed as negligent and not aiding national government in combating terrorism. As resolute as that might sound as a measure—and it would not be the first time in the country for normally elected local officials to be replaced through appointment—care will have to be taken so that it does not become a mere case of replacing one set of elite with another that is more loyal to the new dispensation.
Engr. Nasser M. Tabao of the Marawi City Government pointed out that the conflict sensitive practices of doing no harm and doing maximum good resonate with the Islamic injunction to “enjoin what is right; forbid what is wrong,” which in the Meranaw language is “pamagogopaan so mapia; isapar so marata.”
Connecting to and being guided by Islam and the Meranaw culture will be as vital as observing national and international standards. Hopefully, harnessing the positive aspects of belief systems will challenge Meranaws to address the weaknesses, gaps and inequities that existed before the May 23 outbreak of the crisis, and in the process tackle its roots.
*****
Email feedback to magszmaglana@gmail.com