Almirante: Motion for reconsideration in certiorari

RESPONDENTS Maria Katrina Santos-Falceso and two others filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims against petitioners Genpact Services, Inc. (Genpact) and Danilo Sebastian Reyes. The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The NLRC affirmed the LA ruling.

Respondents moved for reconsideration, which was partly granted by the NLRC, increasing respondents’ entitlement to separation pay. The NLRC resolution explicitly stated that “no further motion of similar import shall be entertained.” Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed outright the petition purely on procedural grounds.

It held that petitioners’ failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC prior to elevating the case to it is a fatal infirmity which rendered the petition dismissible. It further noted that petitioners did not present any plausible justification nor concrete, compelling and valid reason for dispensing with the requirement. Did the CA err?

Ruling: Yes.

Given the extraordinary nature of a Rule 65 petition, the general rule is that a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. xxx This notwithstanding, the foregoing rule admits of well-defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

A review of the records reveals that the exceptions in items (d) and (e) are attendant in this case.

The dispositive portion of the NLRC’s June 30, 2014 resolution which partially granted respondents’ motion for reconsideration, and accordingly, increased their entitlement to separation pay to one month salary per year of service - reads in its entirety:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is partly granted. The assailed Decision is modified in that GENPACT Services LLC is ordered to pay complainants separation pay of one month salary per year of service. The amounts already received by complainants shall be deducted from the amounts due.

No further motion of similar import shall be entertained.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied).

Otherwise worded, the highlighted portion explicitly warns the litigating parties that the NLRC will no longer entertain any motions for reconsideration.

This circumstance gave petitioners the impression that moving for reconsideration before the NLRC would only be an exercise in futility in light of the tribunal’s aforesaid warning.

Section 15, Rule VII of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure provides that the remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration may be availed of once by each party. In this case, only respondents had filed a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC. Applying the foregoing provision, petitioners had an opportunity to file such motion in this case, if they wished. However, the tenor of such warning effectively deprived petitioners of such opportunity, constituting a violation of their right to due process.

All told, petitioners were justified in pursuing a direct recourse to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. To rule otherwise would be antithetical to the tenets of fair play and undue prejudice to petitioners’ rights.

Since the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari solely on procedural grounds, a remand of the case for a resolution on the merits is warranted.

(Perlas-Bernabe, J., SC 1st Division, Genpact Services, Inc. vs. Maria Katrina Santos-Falceso, et.al., G.R. No. 227695, July 31, 2017).

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