By Hu “Angelina” Jing Qi
As a young overseas Chinese student who has studied and lived in the Philippines for many years, my understanding of China-Philippines relations is shaped not merely by international relations theories learned in class, but also by concrete social experiences. During my time in the Philippines, I have personally witnessed the deep interconnection between the two countries across trade, livelihoods, education, and people-to-people exchanges. These ties are not just abstract statistics; they are reflected in business cooperation and the everyday choices of ordinary people in both societies.
It is precisely for this reason that I reflect on the message of the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, Huang Xilian (or “JingQuan” as referenced), who has repeatedly emphasized the concept of “friendship” on multiple public occasions. The Ambassador’s argument — that the Philippines can be a friend to both China and the United States — prompted me to reflect on the possibility of the Philippines serving as a bridge between the two powers. The country’s unique advantages — its longstanding ties with the United States, its extensive engagement with China and its role as the Asean (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) chair in 2026 — significantly enhance its potential to act as a bridge between China and the US, as well as between the major powers and Asean.
In several recent remarks, the Ambassador has stressed that “China’s friends can also be friends of America and America’s friends can likewise be friends of China,” underscoring that relations among major powers are not inherently a zero-sum game. At a time when US–China strategic competition is intensifying and many countries are increasingly pressured into a narrative of “choosing sides,” the Philippines — deeply embedded in both regional and global systems — faces a far more complex reality. Philippine national interests are multidimensional and cross-cutting by nature. Reducing foreign policy choices to a single camp-based alignment would not only fail to address today’s international complexities but could also create unnecessary tensions between security concerns, economic interests, and long-term development goals.
For a long time, discussions on Philippine foreign policy have often been simplified into a single question: should the Philippines stand with China or with the United States? While seemingly realistic, this question assumes a zero-sum logic — that maintaining good relations with one side must inevitably come at the expense of the other. However, both international relations theory and the practical experience of Asean countries suggest that what middle and small states truly need is not alignment within great-power rivalry, but strategic autonomy. The assertion that “friendship is not exclusive” directly challenges this binary mindset. At the same time, it resonates strongly with Asean’s long-standing realist understanding: competition among major powers should not dictate the destiny of smaller states.
From this perspective, what best serves the Philippines’ fundamental interests is not symbolic declarations of loyalty, but the preservation of strategic flexibility, diplomatic maneuverability and policy independence. It is within this context that the Philippines’ value as a “bridge” becomes increasingly clear. Being a bridge does not mean erasing differences between China and America, nor does it require forcing convergence between their positions. Rather, it means ensuring that channels of communication and frameworks for cooperation remain open, preventing competition from sliding into uncontrolled confrontation.
The Philippines’ uniqueness lies in its multiple identities. As a treaty ally of the United States, it is inevitably embedded in the US–Philippines security architecture. As an important economic partner of China, it is deeply integrated into China-centered trade and investment networks. As a member of Asean, the Philippines bears institutional responsibilities for maintaining regional stability and Asean centrality. Looking ahead, the Philippines’ role will become even more consequential as it assumes the Asean chairmanship in 2026 — shifting from a participant to a shaper of the regional agenda.
In this sense, acting as a “bridge” is not a passive burden imposed by external pressures, but an active demonstration of the Philippines’ capacity to manage asymmetrical relationships among major powers. Especially in the context of its upcoming Asean chairmanship, this role carries clear practical implications. It does not require the Philippines to mediate the US–China rivalry, but to prevent Southeast Asia from being trapped in rigid, bloc-based narratives — ensuring that Asean remains a platform for communication rather than a battlefield for competing camps.
Importantly, being a “bridge” is neither an ambiguous compromise nor an avoidance of choice; it is a sober response to existing power realities. It acknowledges differences without allowing them to dominate all aspects of relations. For the Philippines, this approach does not weaken sovereignty — on the contrary, it represents a more mature exercise of it. At a deeper level, it is a test of national self-positioning: can the Philippines articulate a long-term strategy centered on its own interests rather than reacting passively to external pressures? Can it uphold its sovereign claims while avoiding the ideological framing of every disagreement?
As an overseas Chinese student, I care deeply about the trajectory of China-Philippines relations, and I am acutely aware of how vital stable bilateral ties are for ordinary people in both countries. Tensions are not confined to policy documents; they directly affect employment opportunities, educational exchanges, and the future choices of the younger generation. For this reason, placing bilateral relations on a constant footing of confrontation does not serve the fundamental interests of people on either side.
The Philippines possesses an underutilized advantage in its potential to serve as a bridge. Particularly as it prepares for the Asean chairmanship, this role endows the country with a unique capacity to incorporate US–China competition into a multilateral framework, buffer bilateral tensions, and help sustain regional stability. Whether this potential can be translated into a concrete bridging function will directly shape the Philippines’ strategic value within the evolving landscape of great-power competition.