Toral: The cost of selective accountability

Toral: The cost of selective accountability
SunStar ToralDigital Rebel
Published on

Trust is the bedrock of governance. The Constitution itself reminds us that public office is a public trust. Yet we live in a paradox: citizens consistently rank government among the least trusted institutions, and at the same time, political leaders often retain strong personal followings despite unresolved issues of accountability. This contradiction reflects the uneven way governance is applied: sometimes swift and harsh, other times hesitant and selective.

Consider recent debates surrounding the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and its flood control projects. Hearings and discussions in both the Senate and the House of Representatives have revealed conflicts of interest, with some lawmakers linked to construction businesses that directly benefit from public funds. The new DPWH secretary, Vince Dizon, has asked key officials to resign, but resignation alone cannot address the deeper structural weaknesses. Without systemic reform, the cycle of conflict, capture, and compromise continues. For citizens, it translates to recurring floods, wasted resources and disrupted communities.

We have seen similar inconsistencies in how accountability is enforced. Former PNP chief General Nicolas Torre was immediately relieved for overstepping boundaries in a reorganization effort, reflecting a system that can act decisively when it chooses to. At the same time, serious questions remain unanswered about the use of confidential funds by leaders in high office. When investigations stall or are outright refused, it sends the message that accountability depends not on principle but on political position. This erodes trust further because ordinary Filipinos see that rules are applied unevenly, often depending on who is in power rather than what the law requires. These governance failures are not confined to any one administration; they have persisted across political cycles.

The challenge is also in how governance itself is measured. The Governance Commission for GOCCs (GCG) has developed scorecards that assess government-owned corporations on transparency, stakeholder relations, and board responsibilities. These are valuable tools that have raised the bar for corporate governance in the public sector. Yet the current framework focuses heavily on process rather than outcomes. A GOCC like the Philippine Postal Corp. can score highly on governance while its revenues and relevance continue to decline. GCG tools need to evolve. Scorecards must balance compliance with measures of performance, innovation, and public impact. Without this, well-intentioned governance assessments risk creating false assurance.

Many countries in the region have faced similar dilemmas. Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau and Hong Kong’s ICAC show that long-term, independent, and well-resourced institutions can build public trust by ensuring accountability is consistent and predictable. Malaysia’s reforms around its anti-corruption commission also point to how governance can evolve when institutions are strengthened, not politicized. They demonstrate that institutional design can overcome political cycles.

I propose the creation of a National Integrity and Accountability Commission (NIAC), which could help address this. Unlike past bodies such as the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission or the Presidential Anti-Corruption Commission, which were largely tied to the terms of sitting presidents, NIAC must be designed to outlast political transitions. Its mandate should go beyond investigation and enforcement. It must also institutionalize public governance frameworks across agencies, requiring each to adopt clear governance codes, independent oversight committees, and public scorecards that balance process compliance with measurable outcomes.

NIAC would complement, not replace, existing institutions such as the Ombudsman, COA, and the GCG. Each has a vital role to play: the Ombudsman in prosecution, COA in audit, and GCG in corporate governance for GOCCs. NIAC’s distinct contribution would be to bridge the gap between prevention and enforcement, embedding systems that reduce opportunities for abuse before they occur while reinforcing the effectiveness of these existing institutions.

Ultimately, Filipinos deserve more than leaders who campaign on promises of accountability. They deserve institutions that make accountability non-negotiable, consistent and transparent. Public trust will only recover when governance becomes predictable, impartial and rooted in systems rather than personalities. Accountability must be institutional, impartial and non-negotiable. Anything less, and the paradox of trust will persist.

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