THE road to peace in Mindanao is paved with good intentions and broken calendars. We were promised a historic vote in May 2025. It was supposed to be the final seal on the transition of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (Barmm). That date is now effectively dead. The people of the Bangsamoro are once again waiting for a new date to circle on their almanacs.
Senator Juan Miguel “Migs” Zubiri has filed bills to move the election. Zubiri pushes for March 30, 2026. He argues this date strictly follows the Supreme Court’s deadline. The High Court ordered the polls to happen “not later than March 31, 2026.” Zubiri wants to avoid a constitutional crisis. He wants a clean, legal vote that no one can question.
But the House of Representatives has a different view. Lanao del Sur Representative Zia Alonto Adiong filed House Bill No. 7236. He proposes a date of September 28, 2026. His reasoning is practical. The recent exclusion of Sulu from Barmm created a massive legal hole. Seven parliamentary seats vanished overnight. The maps must be redrawn. The automated machines must be reconfigured.
Adiong argues that rushing this complex process for a March deadline invites disaster. He believes September gives the Commission on Elections enough time to do it right.
This creates a standoff between the Senate and the House. One chamber looks at the lawbook. The other looks at the logistics. The people of Mindanao are left watching how this will unfold.
We must ask if this delay honors the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB). The CAB envisioned a smooth transition from conflict to governance. The CAB was signed on March 27, 2014, is the final peace settlement between the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) that ended decades of armed conflict. It serves as the blueprint for the current Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (Barmm).
The CAB includes a provision for an “Exit Agreement.” This agreement officially terminates the peace negotiation process. This includes two main tracks: the Normalization Track, which refers to the decommissioning of MILF combatants and their transformation into civilian life; and the Political Track, or the ratification of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) and the establishment of a functioning, elected Bangsamoro Parliament.
The First Regular Election is a mandatory milestone of the Political Track. Until a regular parliament is elected and seats are filled (including the reallocation of Sulu’s seats), the political transition is technically incomplete. Therefore, the “Exit Agreement” cannot be signed, and the peace process remains in the “implementation phase” rather than being concluded.
Strictly speaking, another delay frustrates the timeline of the Exit Agreement. The roadmap promised an end to the transition period by 2022, then 2025. Now we talk of 2026. Every postponement tests the patience of the Moro people. It delays the full decommissioning of forces. It keeps the region in a state of “interim” governance.
However, a flawed election would be a greater violation of the peace deal. The CAB promises meaningful self-governance. You cannot have meaningful governance if the districts are unconstitutional. You cannot have a valid parliament if the exclusion of Sulu is not properly addressed in the electoral code. A rushed election that disenfranchises voters would betray the spirit of the peace process.
Therefore, the delay is a necessary bitter pill. It is better to wait for a credible election than to rush into a chaotic one. The government must ensure this is the final extension. The Exit Agreement requires substantial compliance, not just speed. We need a parliament that stands on solid legal ground.
The Senate and House must reconcile their dates quickly. Uncertainty breeds anxiety on the ground. The people of the Bangsamoro have waited decades for true autonomy. They can wait a few more months. But they will not wait forever. The polls must open. The transition must end. The promise of the CAB must finally become a reality.