AS THE petitioner in Francisco v. House of Representatives (G.R. No. 160261, 10 November 2003), a landmark case in Philippine constitutional law, I strongly feel the need to clarify and correct the numerous misconceptions regarding the Supreme Court’s recent dismissal of the fourth impeachment complaint filed against Vice-President Sara Duterte.
Also, as a member of the Bar, I am duty-bound to speak up when the credibility of the Supreme Court, as an institution, is being threatened and the public confidence in our justice system is undermined.
The root cause of this controversy stemmed from what happened at the House of Representatives (“House”) during the last Congress, wherein the House circumvented the constitutional one (1)-year bar rule on initiating impeachment proceedings and the ruling of the Supreme Court in Francisco v. House of Representatives.
The House sat on three (3) impeachment complaints (first, second and third) filed by ordinary citizens and endorsed by members of the House. These impeachment complaints were respectively filed on December 2, 2024, December 4, 2024 and December 19, 2024, but the House did not timely act on them, as it was only on its last session day on February 5, 2025, when they were referred by the Secretary General to the House Speaker and were included in the Order of Business.
The House, through the Secretary General, deliberately did not act on these impeachment complaints filed by ordinary citizens, for it waited for a fourth impeachment complaint by more than one-third (1/3) of the members of the House to be filed, and on the last session day of the House on February 5, 2025.
It seems that the House and its leadership refrained from acting on the first three (3) impeachment complaints, to avoid conducting hearings that will mostly take up and even extend beyond the already short session period remaining prior to adjournment. As a result, they violated the constitutionally-guaranteed right to due process of law not only of the respondent but also of the ordinary citizens-complainants in the first three (3) impeachment complaints.
In addition to the grave abuse of discretion on the part of the House, its Secretary General and Speaker, as borne out by the circumvention of the one (1)-year bar rule in the Constitution and the binding precedent in Francisco v. House of Representatives, their conduct was clearly tainted with bad faith. In this regard, the doctrine of operative fact, which requires good faith on the part of the House, its Secretary General and Speaker, finds no application.
It is not true that the Decision of the Supreme Court in Duterte v. House of Representatives (G.R. No. 278353, 25 July 2025) went against its previous ruling in Francisco v. House of Representatives. The said Decision in Duterte v. House of Representatives is correct. There is nothing inconsistent between the former and the latter Decision. In Duterte v. House of Representatives, the Supreme Court was confronted with a new and distinct set of facts which showed that the House clearly violated the Constitution and disregarded its previous ruling in Francisco v. House of Representatives. Thus, the Supreme Court came out with its fresh interpretation of the one (1)-year bar rule guided by the factual and procedural nuances of the present case. In so doing, the Supreme Court merely performed its constitutional mandate to construe the Constitutional provisions and to determine the commission of any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch of the government, in this case, the House, and to correct it accordingly.
But what must be stressed here is that it was the House that transgressed Constitutional boundaries and established jurisprudence by circumventing the one (1)-year bar rule and the ruling of the Supreme Court in Francisco v. House of Representatives. This was clearly grave abuse of discretion on the part of the House and its leadership.